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BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
VOLUME 54 JANUARY 2007 NUMBER 4
Imperialism, Colonialism, and International
Law
JAMES THUO GATHIIt
[The removal of the Maasai from their land] may have been just or
unjust, politic or impolitic, beneficial or injurious, taken as a
whole, to those whose interests are affected. [However, t]hese are
considerations into which this Court cannot enter. It is sufficient
to say that even if a wrong has been done, it is a wrong for which
no Municipal Court of Justice can afford a remedy.'
INTRODUCTION
This Article explores the relationship between
imperialism and colonialism in nineteenth-century
international law. I define imperialism, like late
nineteenth-century theorists, as the spread and expansion
t Governor George E. Pataki Professor of International Commercial Law,
Albany Law School. An earlier version of this Article was presented as a
keynote address in a conference on International Law and Imperialism at the
Birkbeck Law School at the University of London in May 2004. This Article was
also presented at the Feminist and Legal Theory Project Workshop on "Across-
Legal-Cultures-Post-Colonialism," at Emory University Law School on
September 10, 2004. In addition to thanking participants at those events for
their comments, I would also like to thank David Kennedy, Antony Anghie, Joel
Ngugi, Sylvia Kang'ara, Celestine Nyamu, Bhupinder Chimni, Vasuki Nesiah,
Karin Mickelson, Kerry Rittich, Robert Wai, Obiora Okafor, Makau wa Mutua,
H.W.O. Okoth-Ogendo and Nathaniel Berman who over the years provided
feedback on the ideas developed in this Article. I would also like to thank Tania
Magoon for her excellent research assistance on this Article.
1. 01 le Njogo v. Att'y Gen., (1913) 5 E.A.P.L.R. 70, 80 (Kenya) (author
sometimes refers to this case as "the Maasai case").
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of industrial and commercial capitalism. By colonialism, I
mean the territorial annexation and occupation of non-
European territories by European states. While
imperialism was reflected in nineteenth-century English
rules of property, tort, and contract, colonialism was
reflected in nineteenth-century rules of acquisition of title
to territory. My exploration of the relationship between
imperialism and colonialism has two objectives. The first is
to show that international legal doctrines surrounding
British protectorates of the nineteenth century did not
distinguish between imperialism as represented by the
introduction of rules and practices of English private and
business law into the colonies, on the one hand, and
colonialism, particularly as exemplified by rules of
acquisition of title to territory, on the other. My second
objective is to show that the imposition of colonial rule went
hand in hand with the imposition of English rules of
property, tort, and contract, which, in turn, facilitated the
expansion of industrial and commercial capitalism in the
East African Protectorate. Thus, there was a close
relationship between rules of public international law and
those of English rules of property, tort, and contract in
nineteenth-century protectorate jurisprudence. To achieve
these objectives, I use the East African Protectorate as the
springboard for my discussion.
The relationship between imperialism and colonialism
results in three major conclusions. First, this relationship
demonstrates that international legal rules of British
protectorates were internally inconsistent between their
claims of liberty, on the one hand, and their repressive and
illiberal consequences for colonial peoples, on the other.
Second, this inconsistency between the promise of liberty
and the reality of colonial illiberalism created room for
resistance and reconstitution of colonial territorial
acquisition by colonialized peoples. I illustrate this theme of
resistance and effort at challenging the illiberalism of
colonialism using a High Court and East African Court of
Appeal case brought by the Maasai of the East African
Protectorate against the British government. My discussion
of this case shows that this resistance was in part mediated
by invoking rules of English private law such as contract,
property, and tort, as well rules of public international law.
Finally, I show that the international law of
protectorates produced a heterogeneous legal milieu of the
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modern and the traditional that was no less productive of
hierarchical structures of colonialism than those already
embedded in the national laws of colonizing and imperial
powers. For example, British colonialism created the
institution of colonial chiefs thereby melding traditional
religious and Western political leaderships idioms. Further,
British-Maasai contact brought kinship norms and class
society together, creating the beginnings of modern
statehood within the crucible of a non-Western society.
I proceed as follows. I begin by tracing the distinctions
made in the literature between formal and informal
empires, and by showing how the protectorate form of
British colonialism collapsed this distinction. I then proceed
to show how the East African Protectorate government
transmogrified Maasai peasant and property relations and
how the Maasai sought to resist these incursions in British
courts. I proceed to trace how the contestation and
resistance of the expropriation of Maasai land in British
courts was rarified by a highly formalist and positivist
jurisprudence that: argued that the Crown's prerogatives
were limitable by moral principles but not by judicial
review; disaggregated territorial from suspended
sovereignty; and distinguished between power and
jurisdiction, on the one hand, and territorial sovereignty, on
the other. This Article will ultimately conclude by exploring
the parallelisms between the jurisprudence of British courts
surrounding the question of protectorates in the nineteenth
century, and contemporary cases such as those involving
questions of the exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction over
transnational commercial conduct or in the holding of
detainees abroad in the war against terrorism.
I. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND: IMPERIALISM AND
COLONIALISM
Classical theories of imperialism, especially those of
European theorists of the nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries, were never really centrally concerned with the
question of colonialism, except as a necessary but
peripheral appendage of imperial expansion. 2 While my
2. NORMAN ETHERINGTON, THEORIES OF IMPERIALISM: WAR, CONQUEST AND
CAPITAL, at v (1984).
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Article will focus on imperialism and colonialism, the term
"imperialism" has, over the last century, had many
meanings, and its uses in specific historical contexts have
been varied. It has referred to the search for investment
opportunities and markets for surplus capital and
productive capacity, "despotic methods of government,"
"empire building," and "employing the power of the armed
state to secure economic advantages in the world at large."3
It has also referred to the expansion of capitalism through
industrialization and commercial development in the
periphery of an empire, as opposed to territorial
annexations or empire-building.4
Thus I hesitate to present an encompassing definition
of imperialism. Instead, I will be addressing imperialisms.5
The central themes tying these imperialisms together in the
colonial context are the different modes of "dominating,
restructuring, and having authority" over colonial peoples,
both by European and other invaders, as well as by these
outsiders in conjunction with local ruling elites. One
important dimension of the imperialisms I discuss is that
the relations between colonial peoples and their dominators
or overlords cannot be understood outside the prism of
power, domination, hegemony, and control. Thus the
culture, economy, politics, and entire complex of ideas of the
colonial relation are seen or regarded in light of the power
or force of these complex of ideas or even "more precisely
their configurations of power."7 Edward Said illuminatingly
reminded us why studying imperialism is important when
he wrote:
[To believe that politics in the form of imperialism bears upon the
production of literature, scholarship, social theory, and history
writing is by no means equivalent to saying that culture is
therefore a demeaned or denigrated thing. Quite the contrary: my
3. Id. at 5.
4. See John Gallagher & Ronald Robinson, The Imperialism of Free Trade, 6
ECON. HIST. REV. 1-15 (1953).
5. See ETHERINGTON, supra note 2, at 280 (noting, after extensively
reviewing a variety of theories of imperialism, that the word imperialism has
many meanings).
6. I have borrowed this phrase from Edward Said. See EDWARD W. SAID,
ORIENTALISM 3 (1978).
7. Id. at 5.
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whole point is to say that we can better understand the
persistence and the durability of saturating hegemonic systems
like culture when we realize that their internal constraints upon
writers and thinkers were productive, not unilaterally inhibiting.8
Taking up Said's challenge, I will examine a number of
theories of imperialism. In 1895, the date of the declaration
of the East African Protectorate, the British journalist and
socialist H. N. Brailsford argued that the age of imperialism
in Britain had begun. 9 Brailsford's central thesis was that
the British ruling and investing class had built the British
Empire and was its primary beneficiary. He argued that the
British ruling and investing class had achieved this
objective through their control of British foreign policy. 10 As
a socialist, he argued that the British government should be
more transparent and accountable for its foreign policy
decisions. For example, he argued in favor of confiscating
surplus profits of the investing classes as a means of
overcoming the imperialist tendencies of the British ruling
class."1
Brailsford proceeded from the view that imperialism in
the late nineteenth century was the quest by owners of
capital for outlets for their surplus funds in conjunction
with the armed force of the state. 12 He saw imperialism as
the expansion of capitalism in the form of industrial and
commercial development.13  Thus, although European
governments were scrambling over territorial annexations
and empire-building in Africa, this did not constitute
imperialism for Brailsford. For him, imperialism in the last
8. Id. at 14 (emphasis in original).
9. It is noteworthy, though, that by 1820, about a quarter of the world's
population was part of the British empire. See generally Susan Thorne, The
Conversion of Englishmen and the Conversion of the World Inseparable:
Missionary Imperialism and the Language of Class in Early Industrial Britain,
in TENSIONS OF EMPIRE: COLONIAL CULTURES IN A BOURGEOIS WORLD 254
(Frederick Cooper & Ann Laura Stoler eds., 1997).
10. See ETHERINGTON, supra note 2, at 100.
11. See id. at 101.
12. See id.
13. See id. at 102.
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part of the nineteenth century was clearly distinguishable
from territorial annexation or classical colonialism. 14
Indeed, among early nineteenth-century imperialism
theorists, imperialism and colonialism were two different
things. For example, Rosa Luxemberg's and Karl Kautsky's
work on imperialism was not predicated on the creation of
great colonial empires for investment, but rather on the
establishment of an informal empire of free-trade
commercial and investment interests. 15 Luxemberg sought
to explain how capitalism expanded as an economic system
and, like Rudolf Hilferding, saw imperialism as the final
stage of capitalism.16
So far, I have made the claim that imperialism and
colonialism were different things. Let me now briefly
examine how revolutionary socialists like Vladimir Lenin
regarded imperialism and colonialism, and whether these
revolutionaries espoused doctrines that were different from
early nineteenth-century imperialist theorists. Lenin was
critical of both imperialism and colonialism. Yet Lenin
supported, and in fact pursued Soviet conquest, and
justified it as the "dictatorship of the proletariat over
'backward peoples." 17 In effect, Lenin's repression of
nationalist movements to establish a proletarian
dictatorship was no less aggressive than the colonialism of
the capitalist countries that revolutionary socialists
condemned. What distinguished Lenin from Luxemberg
was that Lenin's goal was to account for and predict the
outcomes of capitalist expansion, while Luxemberg's goal
was simply to explain how capitalism expanded as an
economic system.' 8
14. Id. at 102. Etherington notes that theories of economic imperialism "may
mean any of three things: 1) the use of the power of a state beyond its own
borders to serve the interests of private profit seekers; or 2) the use of state
power to secure real or supposed economic advantages for the state; or 3)
financial, commercial or industrial operations by foreign-based companies in
any part of the world, which tend to limit the ability of the indigenous people to
conduct their affairs as they wish." Id. at 190.
15. See id. at 123.
16. See id. at 126.
17. Id. at 193-94.
18. See id. at 127.
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A. The Formation of the East African Protectorate: The
Convergence of Imperialism and Colonialism
In June 1895, the British Crown declared the East
African Protectorate over what is now Kenya. 19 The
immediate reason for the declaration of the protectorate,
without consultation with the inhabitants, was the inability
of the Imperial British East Africa Company to finance the
administration of the territory and the refusal of the Crown
to finance the operations of the Company.20  The
protectorate was sold to the British government for
£250,000. This ended the Imperial British East Africa
Company's seven-year trade and commercial monopoly. 21
The directors of the Imperial British East Africa Company
decided to sell the protectorate to the British government to
make the company's commercial and trading ventures
profitable, since the British government would assume the
task and cost of administering the territory.22
The coexistence of imperialism and colonialism in the
East African Protectorate is evidenced by the British
purchase of both the territory and the seven-year trade and
commercial monopoly the Imperial British East Africa
Company had previously enjoyed. In the conjoining of
territorial control and the monopoly over trade and
commerce, the British declaration of the East African
Protectorate of 1895 fused the informal empire imperialism,
which scholars like Luxemberg had already identified as
correlated with the growth of capitalism, 23 with the formal
empire of territorial ownership that the British were
engaging in, and that Lenin was actively pursuing. In the
fusion between colonialism and imperialism, protectorates
collapsed the distinction between imperialism (or the
expansion of surplus investment capital) and colonialism
19. See Mwangi Wa-Githumo, Land and Nationalism in East Africa: The
Impact of Land Expropriation and Land Grievances Upon the Rise and
Development of Nationalist Movements in Kenya 1884-1939, at 206 (Feb. 1974)
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, New York University) (on file with Bobst
Library, New York University).
20. See id. at 204-05.
21. See id. at 205.
22. See id. at 204-05.
23. ETHERINGTON, supra note 2, at 123.
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(or the aggressive foreign policies of conquering states in
their territorial acquisitions). Thus, as Kautsky asserted,24
imperialism was not the final stage of capitalism as
Luxemberg and others had argued. 25 Rather, imperialism's
constant drive to expand-as the purchase of the East
African Protectorate and its trade and commercial
monopoly by the British government illustrates-was '"one
of the very conditions of the existence of capitalism.' ' 26
B. Maasai Communalism and British Class Society:
Transformation, Resistance, and Reconstitution
The declaration of the East African Protectorate in 1895
was the first stage in the transformation of what we now
know as Kenya into a State based not on kinship authority,
but on the domination of the non-producing class (the
capitalists), over the producers (the wage-laborers). In a
sense, contemporary Kenya-where the domination by the
capitalists is necessary to safeguard the appropriation of
surplus value not so much through force, but through
"rights of property in the means of production and in the
product and by the impersonal operation of the market"27-
is the state created following the establishment of the East
African Protectorate in 1895.28
The acquisition of the East African Protectorate by the
British and the extension of rules of private property, tort,
and contract into East Africa, in turn, interacted with
preexisting norms and practices of the African peoples in
the protectorate. In this section, I will explore how the
24. See id. at 120.
25. See id.
26. Id. (quoting Karl Kautsky, Ultra-imperialism, 59 NEW LEFT REV. 41, 42
(1970)).
27. See Partha Chatterjee, More on Modes of Power and the Peasantry, in
SELECTED SUBALTERN STUDIES 351, 359 (Ranajit Guha & Gayatri Chakravorty
Spivak eds., 1988). On how supposedly freely negotiated contracts have
replaced conquest as the way in which the new imperial international law
legitimizes unequal relations between rich and poor countries, see the excellent
and original analysis of ANTONY ANGHIE, IMPERIALISM, SOVEREIGNTY AND THE
MAKING OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 239-44 (2005).
28. Here I am not asserting a linear progression from pre-colonial Kenya, to
protectorate, to colony, and finally to state. Rather, each of these is a
genealogical mode, each displaying its own unique dialectics and imperialisms.
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communalism of the Maasai in East Africa interacted with
the capitalist mode of production that accompanied British
colonialism. The extension of colonialism and projection of
imperialism into East Africa involved a process of struggle
of contradictory interests-in this case, and taking a bird's
eye view, the Maasai peasantry, on the one hand, and the
British settlers together with the British-appointed Maasai
"leadership" backed by the force of empire, on the other.
The Maasai, like many of the communities of the East
African Protectorate, were communal or peasant societies
governed largely through kinship ties rather than
centralized authority. 29 Colonial and imperial contact
introduced a new type of relationship-a class society.
Unlike a kinship society, a class society has state
functionaries that lay claim on the society's social surplus.
Prior to colonial contact, the Maasai had no such state
functionaries. 30 In other words, the Maasai did not have an
institutionalized system of surplus extraction that would
exist in a class society. The intersection of the Maasai
peasantry and their "leadership" and the British settlers, in
the crucible of colonial conquest and the bourgeois
jurisprudence of British courts produced a dialectic of
external domination and resistance as well as new forms of
domination essential to the establishment of colonial
governance and, much later on, the post-colonial state.
As we shall see, British colonialism in East Africa
became a tragedy for the Maasai peasantry. As such, the
imposition of colonial rule over the Maasai and the
expropriation of Maasai land met both of the conditions
that Robert Brenner identified as unambiguously favoring
the supremacy of the interests of capital over those of the
peasants in the feudal duel between serfs (peasants) and
lords: first, where serfdom (or, in our case, Maasai
peasantry) has been destroyed; and, secondly, where the
emergence of the predominance of peasant property is
29. See Wa-Githumo, supra note 19, at 215.
30. See Chatterjee, supra note 27, at 363. As Partha Chatterjee reminds us,
it is theoretically legitimate to distinguish societies that had "recognized offices
of authoritative functionaries . . . from class society proper because chiefdom
may still not necessarily imply an institutionalized claim on the social surplus
based on political domination .... Id.
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circumvented. 31 Yet, while the predominance of Maasai
property was circumvented, and the Maasai as a
community was adversely affected by the expropriation of
their lands, capitalist relations did not establish themselves
unambiguously-rather, there was a continuity of Maasai
pastoral practices within the emerging capitalism of the
colonial economy. 32 At best, the outcome of the encounter
between the Maasai and the British settler class was the
beginning of a dialectical struggle between two
irreconcilable visions: one Maasai and the other British (as
exported to the East African Protectorate by British
settlers).33  Moreover, this dialectical struggle was
complicated by the fact that among the Maasai there
emerged a class of leaders whose legitimacy was
established by bourgeois forms of legality and without
consultation with the Maasai people.34 Hence, the Maasai
cannot and could not be understood as a homogenous
communal or peasant group, as will become clear in
discussing the treaties entered into on behalf of the Maasai
and the British.
My goal in analyzing the intersection of the
communalism of the Maasai and the class structure
introduced by the colonialism of the British settler
community is to open up a space of inquiry by exploring the
relationship between imperialism and colonialism. Gaytri
Spivak has, for example, written about broadening Michel
Foucault's important work that demonstrated the
emergence of new forms of power in the procedural
techniques of European imperialism in the seventeenth and
eighteenth centuries:
Sometimes it seems as if the very brilliance of Foucault's analysis
of the centuries of European imperialism produces a miniature
version of that heterogeneous phenomenon: management of
space-but by doctors; development of administrations-but in
31. See Robert Brenner, Agrarian Class Structure and Economic
Development in Pre-Industrial Europe, 70 PAST AND PRESENT 30, 47 (1976).
32. See Joel Ngugi, The Decolonization-Modernization Interface and the
Plight of Indigenous Peoples in Post-Colonial Development Discourse in Africa,
20 WIS. INT'L L.J. 297 (2002).
33. For these insights, I am indebted to Partha Chatterjee. See Chatterjee,
supra note 27, at 366.
34. See Chatterjee, supra note 27, at 358.
1022 [Vol. 54
IMPERIALISM
asylums; considerations of the periphery-but in terms of the
insane, prisoners, and children. The clinic, the asylum, the prison,
the university-all seem to be screen-allegories that foreclose a
reading of the broader narratives of imperialism.3 5
My project is this broader context of the intersection of
colonialism and imperialism; for, as Spivak contemplates,
and as Partha Chatterjee reminds us again with reference
to limiting analysis of imperialism to "modern" forms and
institutions,
[w]hen one looks at regimes of power in the so-called backward
countries of the world today, not only does the dominance of the
characteristically "modern" modes of exercise of power seem
limited and qualified by persistence of older modes, but by the fact
of their combination in a particular state formation, it seems to
open up at the same time an entirely new range of possibilities for
the ruling classes to exercise their domination. 36
The genealogically and historically aware methodology
I am advocating here has the advantage of complexifying
simplistic visions about the purity of anti-colonial struggles,
which portray non-Western societies as classless and as
"unanimously and heroically resisting the onslaught of
'Western imperialism.' 37  Thus, for example, the
establishment of colonial authority figures among the
Maasai by the British East African administration did not
completely abolish Maasai structures and symbols of
authority; rather, these Western bourgeois forms
appropriated Maasai authority institutions and modified
them to create the equivalent of a comprador class of
Maasai, who in turn served to legitimate the expropriation
35. Gaytri Spivak, Can the Subaltern Speak?, in MARXISM AND THE
INTERPRETATION OF CULTURE 271, 291 (Cary Nelson & Lawrence Grossberg eds.,
1988) (emphasis added).
36. Chatterjee, supra note 27, at 390.
37. ETHERINGTON, supra note 2, at 272. Etherington argues that such a
methodology has the advantage of showing that non-Western societies had
"ruling classes, exploited peasantries, subjugated females and slaves." And that
"[b]y exploding the myths of Merrie Africa, spiritual Asia and other
Rousseauistic fantasies, [this methodology has] made the cardboard 'victims of
imperialism' into human beings of flesh and blood." This methodology also
"implicitly challenge[s] the self-serving propaganda of ruling elites in many
parts of the world who find it highly convenient to attribute all the ills of their
people to the legacy of colonialism." Id.
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of Maasai land. Thus, far from ending Maasai forms and
symbols of authority, the superimposition of colonial
administration transmogrified them with a view to make
them meet the demands of appropriating Maasai land.38
C. The Transmogrification of Maasai Peasantry and their
Property Relations
Prior to British contact, the Maasai were a communal
subsistence society. 39 They were communal in the sense
that they lived in large groups or clans that collectively
owned large herds of cattle, and they collectively grazed
throughout the then-unfenced Rift Valley region of present
day Kenya, moving from point to point depending on where
the best pastures could be found.40 They were largely
subsistence in the sense that the herds were held for their
cultural value to the Maasai-especially in ritual sacrifice-
and for food rather than for sale. 41
A major organizing principle of the pre-colonial Maasai
was defense from external threats, particularly those of
neighboring communities like the Kikuyu, who were raiding
them for their cattle, and also to keep themselves and their
cattle from destroying the neighboring Kikuyu farmlands
and settled homesteads. 42 In fact, the Maasai were, in the
late nineteenth century, famed as one of the fiercest
warring communities in the East African region. 43 They
used their permanent warring force not only to defend
themselves but also to ensure their uninhibited access to
grazing for their cattle in the East African region.44
However, authority among the Maasai was based on
38. This analysis is largely inspired by Chatterjee, supra note 27, at 388-89.
See also MAHMOOD MAMDANI, CITIZEN AND SUBJECT: CONTEMPORARY AFRICA AND
THE LEGACY OF LATE COLONIALISM 119-22, 145-65 (Geoff Eley, Nicholas B. Dirks
& Sherry B. Ortner eds., 1996).
39. See Wa-Githumo, supra note 19, at 215.
40. See G. R. SANDFORD, AN ADMINISTRATIVE AND POLITICAL HISTORY OF THE
MASAI RESERVE 20 (1919).
41. See ROBERT R. TIGNOR, THE COLONIAL TRANSFORMATION OF KENYA: THE
KAMBA, KIKUYU, AND MAASAI FROM 1900 TO 1939, at 13 (1976).
42. See id. at 7-8.
43. See SANDFORD, supra note 40, at 2.
44. See id. at 3.
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kinship and religious beliefs, and not simply on domination.
Maasai leaders were religious figureheads known as
laibons.45
The contact between the Maasai and the British in the
period prior to the annexation of the British East African
Protectorate in 1895 occurred at a time when the Maasai
were experiencing declining fortunes. First, there was a
feud between two claimants to become the next religious
leader or laibon.46 Second, the Maasai were going through
an environmental and epidemic disaster that resulted in
the sickness and death of millions of their valued cattle. 47
Third, the emerging British administration in the East
African Protectorate, which was heavily biased in favor of
settler interests in land, hung like the sword of Damocles
over Maasai land.48
In the absence of these predicaments, the Maasai were
otherwise known to have had a relatively higher level of
resistance to the imposition of colonial rule than
neighboring communities such as the Kikuyu for at least
two main reasons. First, Maasai "[1]ivestock served as a
barrier against colonial control," since the Maasai were not
seeking to sell their labor to European farms or in the
emerging colonial administration for their livelihood. 49 In
addition, Maasai warriors remained away from missionary
and colonial schools and wage laboring on European settler
farms, since they could sell off their cattle to raise colonial
taxes. 50 By contrast, the Kikuyu, a neighboring community
to the Maasai, used their central geographical location in
relation to the colonial settlements not only to engage in
commercialized small-scale farming and wage laboring on
European farms to pay taxes, but also to attend colonial,
missionary, and, ultimately, Kikuyu-established schools.51
The second reason accounting for a higher ability to resist
British colonial rule was that the Masaai, unlike the
45. See TIGNOR, supra note 41, at 13.
46. See id.
47. See id.
48. See Wa-Githumo, supra note 19, at 215-16.
49. See TIGNOR, supra note 41, at 9.
50. See SANDFORD, supra note 40, at 2-20.
51. See TIGNOR, supra note 41, at 9.
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Kikuyu, did not have "[p]owerful and cooperative colonial
chiefs . . . who . . . were able to create rudimentary
instruments of local government, mainly composed of a
large number of young followers who did their bidding and
that of the British overrulers. 52
Let us now briefly examine how the aforementioned
predicaments made the Maasai, a society otherwise highly
resistant to British colonization, amenable to colonization.
At the end of the nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth
century, the various Maasai communities suffered a series
of crippling internal wars over the vast seasonal grazing
lands of the present-day Kenyan Rift Valley and suffered
several natural disasters ranging from droughts and famine
to a small-pox epidemic and locust infestations. 53 These
problems, as we shall see below, were some of the
immediate reasons accounting for the Maasai's softening
attitude towards intrusion of British settlers into their
lands in the Rift Valley.
At the same time, a majority of white settlers and the
protectorate government looked down upon the Maasai as a
backward community. This attitude, together with
increasing settler demand for land, laid a basis for seizures
of Maasai land for settler occupation. A protectorate
government publication reflected this attitude toward the
Maasai in the following terms: "[T]heir conservatism has
been so great, and their subservience to antiquated tribal
custom and tradition has been so powerful that it has
proved impossible as yet materially to alter and renovate
their ideas."54 This attitude laid an important basis for
justifying the forced restriction of the Maasai from their
grazing land following increased white settler pressure on
the protectorate government to take such action.
52. Id. at 7. Tignor also notes that the Maasai "looked upon their flocks as a
safeguard against the distasteful undertakings they saw the Kikuyu engaged
in." Id. at 9.
53. See John Lonsdale, The Conquest of the State of Kenya 1895-1905, in
UNHAPPY VALLEY: CONFLICT IN KENYA & AFRICA, BOOK ONE: STATE AND CLASS 13,
22-25 (Bruce Berman & John Lonsdale eds., 1992). Further recorded epidemics
that exacerbated these calamities included jiggers and rinderpest. Id at 23.
54. SANDFORD, supra note 40, at 1. At another place in the report, Sandford
noted that, "the Masai, who number all told about 43,000 souls, possess capital
to an average amount of rather more than £110 per head. They are thus, in all
probability, the richest uncivilised tribe in the world." Id. at 3.
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While there was almost no doubt that the civilizing
mission of displacing the Maasai's antiquated customs was
justified with the invariable goodness of the "blesssings [sic]
of science and technology, of literacy and education, of
peaceful communities and respectable religion," some white
colonists were worried by the cruel injustice that
accompanied this mission. 55 Yet, when it came to the
appropriation of Maasai land for white settlers and
commercial interests, this opposition-including that of the
Secretary of State for Colonies-was muzzled. 56
Although it is disputed whether the British colonial
government was responsible for undermining the ability of
the different East African Protectorate communities to
organize their means of "survival, offence and defence" 57
against the natural disasters facing these communities at
the end of the nineteenth century, John Lonsdale has
argued that "it is scarcely open to doubt that many more of
the poor would have died had they not been able to find a
new refuge in the civil and military labour markets of
conquest." 58
D. Creating Consent: The Invention of a Paramount Maasai
Chief and the 1904 Maasai Agreement
Capitalizing on the dispute between two Maasai
brothers (Lenana and Sendeyu) over the ascendancy of a
new Maasai spiritual leader, or laibon, the opportunistic
interests of some white settler farmers and commercial
interests coincided with Lenana's desire to ascend his
father's laibonship.59 While within the Maasai a laibon was
only a spiritual leader, the expediency of the protectorate
government was to remake him to serve its interests. By
55. George Shepperson, Introduction to the Fourth Edition of NORMAN LEYs,
KENYA, at vii, vii (4th ed. 1973). Another group of colonists detested the
"destruction by an aggressive European imperialism, under the banner of
'Progress', of the noble savagery of the old Africa with, as it seemed to them, its
communal virtues, its simple but practical self-sufficiency, and its invigorating
closeness to Nature." Id.
56. See id. at 119-28.
57. See Lonsdale, supra note 53, at 25.
58. Id.
59. See SANDFORD, supra note 40, at 15-18.
20071 1027
1028 BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 54
appointing him a paramount chief, Lenana was on the path
to being a more reliable ally whose authority the
protectorate government could use to gain control over the
feared Maasai warriors and the fertile Maasai grazing land
in the Rift Valley. 60 From around 1893, the protectorate
government sided with the cooperative Lenana against his
brother Sendeyu. 61 It was Lenana who finally agreed to
have the Maasai vacate their rich grazing land in the Rift
Valley under the 1904 Maasai Agreement in return for
British recognition that he was the "leader" of the Maasai. 62
Under the 1904 Agreement, Lenana, together with other
signatories on behalf of the Maasai-who did not
participate in writing the agreement and who did not read
the agreement itself since they themselves could not
read 63-agreed that the Maasai could not be moved from
the Laikipia reserve "so long as the Masai as a race shall
exist."64 However, in 1911, the British administration in
Kenya, under enormous pressure from settlers, sought to
move the Maasai again, clearly in contravention of the 1904
Agreement. 65 As we shall see, this second agreement was
60. See id. According to Sandford, "[firom at least 1850 to the early eighties,
the pastoral Masai were a formidable power in East Africa. They successfully
asserted themselves against the Arab slave-traders, took tribute from all who
passed through their country, and treated other races, whether African or not,
with the greatest arrogance." Id. at 9.
61. As early as 1893, Lenana was approached by the British to forbid
Maasai warrior raids into the neighboring German Tanganyika mandate
against Lenana's rival brother, Sendeyu. Under the terms of the Berlin treaty,
the British were responsible for stopping encroachment of a rival power's
territory. This worked out quite well for both Lenana and the protectorate
government; since the government did not have the military force to stop the
raids, Lenana could be relied on to forbid the raids, while the British in return
promised to give Lenana military help if Sendeyu crossed into British territory.
See Richard Waller, The Maasai and the British 1895-1905: The Origins of an
Alliance, 17 J. AFR. HIST. 529, 545 (1976).
62. See SANDFORD, supra note 40, at 180.
63. See GIDEON S. WERE & DEREK A. WILSON, EAST AFRICA THROUGH A
THOUSAND YEARS 165 (Africana Publ'g Corp. 1970) (1968) ("The Masai and their
leaders had no important say in the transaction, as the only alternative to a
voluntary move was forceful eviction. Thus there was no 'agreement' on the part
of the Masai to move. Moreover, their leaders neither participated in the
drafting of the 'Agreement' nor understood its full implications, couched, as it
was, in a strange legal phraseology.").
64. Id.
65. See id.
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the immediate reason for a judicial challenge-a case that
constituted resistance towards the territorial dispossession
of the Maasai.
Two familiar techniques of colonial governance were
being deployed in the relations between Lenana and the
protectorate government. First, there was the creation of
"traditional" authority to legitimize British colonial
governance through Lenana's enthronement as the leader
of the Maasai; 66 and second, the subsequent deployment of
Maasai warriors in British punitive and cattle-stock-raiding
operations on the authority of Lenana not only met the
protectorate's mission of military conquest, but also
authorized the very violence the colonial authorities had
deplored of the Maasai by the British.67
Let us examine both briefly. Lenana has been described
as "the fulcrum upon which the levers of British policy
rested."68 When the protectorate government appointed
Lenana an administrative chief of the Maasai, it was
unaware that a laibon was a ritual expert and not a
political leader.69 Paradoxically, Lenana's ascendancy as
the paramount chief of the Maasai resulted in his loss of
authority, especially among the Maasai warriors upon
whom the British had relied to conquer recalcitrant "tribes"
and accumulate booty. 70 Lenana's inability to bring the
warriors under his control also distanced him from the
British. Eventually, when the British reorganized
protectorate forces in 1902, these forces became an
alternative to Lenana's Maasai warriors.7 1 Consequently,
the use by the protectorate government of what it perceived
as the "savage force" of the Maasai to establish themselves
over East African Protectorate communities, by
incorporating Maasai warriors into the newly established
protectorate force, effectively sanctioned the same violence
66. See generally MAMDANI, supra note 38; MARTIN CHANOCK, THE MAKING OF
SOUTH AFRICAN LEGAL CULTURE 1902-1936: FEAR, FAVOUR AND PREJUDICE
(2001).
67. See Lonsdale, supra note 53, at 23-27.
68. Waller, supra note 61, at 540.
69. See id. at 541-42. In 1901, Lenana was elevated to a "salaried status"
with a monthly allowance of six British pounds. Id. at 543.
70. See id. at 542.
71. See id. at 549.
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the warriors had been shunned for, only this time it was
regarded as a lawful exercise of legitimate or civil violence
based on law and reason.72
As previously noted, although he was now a paramount
Chief, Lenana's authority was undermined by his
collaboration with the British protectorate government. 73
Consequently, the British became the "dominant partners
in the alliance"; Maasai interests were thereafter relegated
to the side. 74  Colonial governance created Lenana's
authority precisely to undermine his community and gain
control of it. There can be no better way of establishing how
well this claim fits Lenana's fate and that of the Maasai
than to examine the adjudication surrounding the Maasai
Agreements of 1904 and 1911 in the Maasai case.
The relationship between the various Maasai
communities and their cattle and the British, as reflected
by these two agreements, was procured by force, deception
and organized lobbying by British colonial interests. Hence,
Richard Waller has noted that while the 1904 and 1911
Agreements emphasized the "special status" of Maasai-
British relations in the East African Protectorate, the
agreements "in fact marked the beginning of a long retreat
from involvement with the colonial power and the
replacement of a highly flexible and innovatory response to
the advent of colonial rule by a determination to preserve
their society intact, which was both rigid and deeply
suspicious of further innovation. ' 75
72. Several measures were tried by the protectorate government to stop
Maasai warriors from their "barbarous acts being performed under the shelter
of [the British] flag." Id. at 549. These measures included the promulgation of a
strict code of conduct for punitive expeditions. Id. at 549-50. For a similar
(though not parallel) experience among the indigenous communities of Papua
New Guinea and Australian colonialists, see Joseph Pugliese, Cartographies of
Violence: Heterotopias and the Barbarism of Western Law, 7 AUSTL. FEMINIST
L.J. 21, 23-25 (1996).
73. Terence Ranger, The Invention of Tradition in Colonial Africa, in THE
INVENTION OF TRADITION 211, 236 (Eric Hobsbawm & Terence Ranger eds.,
1986). According to Ranger, "the colonial manipulation of monarchy and indeed
the whole process of traditional inventiveness, having served a good deal of
practical purpose, eventually came to be counterproductive" for the Maasai. Id.
74. Waller, supra note 61, at 549. This was the process of turning the savage
into a soldier. See Ranger, supra note 73, at 234.
75. See Waller, supra note 61, at 529.
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E. Formal and Informal Empire in the East African
Protectorate and the Maasai Case: From Slave Trade to
Free Trade
There were at least two imperialisms in Maasai-British
relations in the East African Protectorate. The first was the
expanding form of capitalism into East Africa, or the
informal empire of trade and commerce. The second was, of
course, territorial acquisition of East Africa to become part
of the formal British empire. I will first address the
interplay between the informal imperialism of expanding
capitalism and formal empires of colonial territorial control
in the East African Protectorate. The Imperial British East
Africa Company justified its interest in this region on the
premise that legitimate commerce or trade was the best
cure for slave trade.76 Thus the Company's objectives, and
subsequently those of the British administration after 1895,
were justified by the humanitarian objective of supplanting
the vibrant slave trade that was primarily headquartered
off the East African coast. 77 To do this, the protectorate
administration argued in favor of cutting links with the rich
financiers and owners of the slave routes and caravans off
the East African coast, who were mostly Swahili and
Arab. 78 The protectorate government argued that cutting
these links would instead help establish agricultural
plantations and ranching farms for European settlers
funded not by the slave trade financiers, but by flows of
capital from the British government and private sources in
Europe. 79
Together with the introduction of rules of private
property, tort, and contract, these flows of capital, in turn,
helped to consolidate the establishment of an informal
76. See generally id. at 540-42.
77. See Wa-Githumu, supra note 19, at 201.
78. See id. at 202.
79. See id.
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empire of trade and commerce in the protectorate.8 0 Some
critics have argued that the sources of capital from Britain
were too small compared to the expenditure necessary to
establish colonial administration and, therefore, that there
could not have been economic imperialism in East Africa in
the sense that Luxemberg, Hobson, and others argued. s1
However, such an analysis ignores the various forms and
ways in which colonial possessions became indispensable to
British capital and industry for their growth and
development over many decades, particularly as protected
sources of cheap raw materials like cotton. In addition,
capital flows to these colonial possessions generated
enormous linkages of political alliances that were
indispensable to those involved on both ends of the
relationship, which, in turn, sustained the continued
commercial and industrial links between the core and the
periphery.8 2 Thus, as Richard D. Wolf has convincingly
argued, merely focusing on economic aggregates to discount
the case for economic imperialism, without specifics as to
the underlying historically developed economic structures
and patterns of investment 8 3-and, I may add, their legal
forms-is to miss a big part of the picture of British
imperialism in East Africa.
Having demonstrated the relationship between
imperialism as the expanding capitalism of empire and
colonial territorial occupation, I will now proceed to discuss
how rules of international law mediated the conflict
80. For example, the Companies Act of 1907, 7 Edw. 7 c. 50 (Eng.), was
made applicable to the East African Protectorate by the Companies Act of 1908,
8 Edw. 7. c. 12 (Eng.), which, in relevant part, enabled "any company
incorporated in a British Possession, which has . . .[satisfied the] particulars
specified in . . .the Companies Act, 1907, shall have the same power to hold
land in the United Kingdom as if it were a company incorporated under the
Companies Acts, 1862 to 1907." The Crown Lands Ordinance of 1915 made all
land in Kenya Crown land and introduced the concept of private ownership of
land. See Crown Lands Ordinance No. 12 (1915). See also TIGNOR, supra note
41, at 30.
81. See generally D. K. FIELDHOUSE, ECONOMICS AND EMPIRE 1830-1914
(1973).
82. See generally KWAME NKURUMAH, NEO-COLONIALISM: THE LAST STAGE OF
IMPERIALISM (1965); WALTER RODNEY, How EUROPE UNDERDEVELOPED AFRICA
(1973).
83. See RICHARD D. WOLFF, THE ECONOMICS OF COLONIALISM: BRITAIN AND
KENYA, 1870-1930, at 29 (1974).
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between the Maasai's claim of a British breach of contract
and the British government's defense of its decision to move
the Maasai away from their land inconsistently with their
promise in 1904 not to do so. I will begin by briefly
discussing the institution of British protectorates, as this
was the international legal institution that played the most
crucial role in mediating the conflict between the Maasai
and the British.
II. THE STATUS OF PROTECTORATES UNDER NINETEENTH-
CENTURY INTERNATIONAL LAW
As alluded to earlier, in 1895 the British government
declared East Africa a protectorate. Protectorates were a
very unique form of empire. They were an interlude
between full annexation and the pre-colonial status.
Scholars of international law like W. E. Hall have argued
that protectorates were a mode of avoiding the assumption
of financial burden for colonial possessions.8 4 The East
African Protectorate lasted for twenty-five years, 1895-
1920. In 1920, Britain acquired full power over the whole
country by declaring it a colony.8 5 However, the fact that
East Africa was not fully incorporated into the British
Empire between 1895 and 1920 did not hinder the
protecting administration from opening up the country to
British settler occupation and controlling its inhabitants as
fully as if it were a colony. In fact, many observers have
noted that protectorates were governed as colonies-which
were, according to the logic of the Crown, the best example
of territory within the dominions of the Crown.86
Thus, while in the theory of British protectorates, East
Africa was a foreign country outside the dominions of the
British government, in practice and contrary to the East
African Court of Appeal decision in 01 le Nogo v. Attorney
84. See W. E. HALL, INTERNATIONAL LAW 27 (1880).
85. See Y. P. GHA & J. P. W. B. McAuSLAN, PUBLIC LAW AND POLITICAL
CHANGE IN KENYA: A STUDY OF THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK OF GOVERNMENT FROM
COLONIAL TIMES TO THE PRESENT 20-21 (1970).
86. See Alison Field-Juma, Governance and Sustainable Development, in IN
LAND WE TRUST: ENVIRONMENT, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE
9, 19 (Calestous Juma & J. B. Ojwang eds., 1996).
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General,87 the East African Protectorate was really a part of
the British Empire as much as it was during the
subsequent colony period. The effect of the holding in 01 le
Njogo is that, although East Africa was a foreign country
outside the dominions of the Crown, the Crown or its
representatives had unlimited powers in the protectorate.88
Another paradoxical aspect of this case is that the
Maasai argued that they did not have sovereignty since the
British government was exercising full criminal, civil,
legislative, executive, and judicial functions in the
protectorate, and, in fact, had complete control and
jurisdiction.8 9 Thus, the Maasai claimed that they, like
other British subjects who were under its complete control
and jurisdiction, could bring suit to enforce the 1904
Agreement under which the Maasai were relocated to a
reserve from where the British promised not to remove
them "so long as the Masai as a race shall exist."90
By contrast, on behalf of the British Crown, it was
argued that the Maasai were sovereign, since a protectorate
was outside the dominions of the Crown; and, since the
Maasai resided in a foreign country, they were sovereign by
virtue of having territorial sovereignty and had, as such,
validly entered into the 1904 treaty.91 The paradox here is
that it was the Maasai who were arguing they were not
sovereign and it was the British who were arguing that the
Maasai were sovereign. In reality, the British government
was both de jure92 and de facto93 exercising its full plenary
authority as if the protectorate was a colony.
87. 01 le Njogo v. Att'y Gen., (1913) 5 E.A.P.L.R. 70, 89 (Kenya) (holding
that the East Africa Protectorate was a foreign country and not part of the
British dominion).
88. For a similar example in the U.S. context, see, e.g., Worcester v. Georgia,
31 U.S. 515, 560-61 (1832), in which the Court noted that the "settled doctrine
of the law of nations is, that a weaker power does not surrender its
independence-its right to self government, by associating with a stronger, and
taking its protection."
89. 01 le Njogo, 5 E.A.P.L.R. at 86-87.
90. Id. at 73.
91. See id. at 86.
92. By virtue of the Foreign Jurisdiction Act of 1890, 53 & 54 Vict., c. 37
(Eng.).
93. By virtue of Crown's actual control of the protectorate.
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The Attorney General for the British government was,
in effect, arguing in favor of a fictional sovereignty for the
Maasai by conveniently ignoring the fact that the Maasai
were a fully administered tribe of the Crown. To advance
this theory of fictional sovereignty successfully, 94 the
Attorney General made rigorously formalist and strictly
positivist arguments seeking to convince the court to
recognize the East African Protectorate not for what it
actually was, but simply to accept the label of a protectorate
being a foreign country. 95
The Maasai, by contrast, made anti-positivist
arguments to demonstrate that the positivist arguments
advanced on behalf of the Crown were spurious at best. For
example, the Maasai argued that since an East African
Legislative Council had been established, it would not have
been conceivable that the Maasai had any vestige of
sovereignty left.96 In addition, it was plausible to argue that
British settlement over Maasai land that had begun before
the 1904 Agreement constituted a mode of acquisition of
territory by the Crown. 97 Thus, as the Maasai argued, they
were not an independent state capable of entering into
treaties. 98  Indeed, suggesting that the Maasai were
sovereign was to overlook the fact that Lenana, designated
the Chief Laibon by the British, and all the other
representatives who supposedly signed the 1904 treaty on
behalf of the Maasai, were all chosen by the East African
Commissioner. 99
94. The Court of Appeal for East Africa indeed argued, "[a] declaration of a
Protectorate in itself has no such effect [making the Maasai British subjects], as
in theory such a declaration presupposes the existence of both a protecting and
protected states and the continuance in the latter of some elements of
sovereignty." 01 le Njogo, 5 E.A.P.L.R. at 91 (emphasis added).
95. See id. at 86-89.
96. See id. at 81.
97. Daniel J. Hulsebosch, The Ancient Constitution and the Expanding
Empire: Sir Edward Coke's British Jurisprudence, 21 LAW & HIST. REV. 439, 472
(2003). Note that Morris Carter, C.J., of the Court of Appeal for Eastern Africa
observed that "[iut has not been argued before us that East Africa has been
acquired by settlement by His Majesty, nor has the Court been asked to take
any evidence upon this point." 01 le Njogo, 5 E.A.P.L.R. at 89.
98. See 01 le Njogo, 5 E.A.P.L.R. at 80.
99. See id. at 77.
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The East African Court of Appeal disagreed with the
assertions that the Maasai were subjects of the British
Empire and instead endorsed the arguments made on
behalf of the British crown, holding that the Maasai had
validly entered into the agreement of 1904 since they had
retained sovereignty to sign a treaty with the British
government. 100 This holding that the Maasai retained
sovereignty to enter into a treaty, although they were a
protected group of the British government, was held
sufficient to overcome the argument that the Maasai had
entered into a land-related civil contract cognizable in a
British court. 101 In effect, in 01 le Njogo, although the
British government's jurisdiction in theory was limited,
since Kenya was a protectorate and therefore not part of
the British empire like a colony, the Court nevertheless
immunized the British government's conduct from judicial
challenge.
By finding that the agreements were treaties, the court
effectively prohibited the Maasai from founding their legal
claims in equity on either contract or tort. Thus, the
argument on behalf of the Maasai-i.e., that the British
government failed its obligations as trustee to uphold the
commitments it made to the Maasai in the 1904 Agreement
not to move them from the Laikipia Reserve' 02-failed
when both the High Court and Court of Appeal held the
agreements to be treaties and thus that no action could lie
against them. 10 3 Similarly, injunctive relief preventing the
implementation of the 1911 Agreement as a violation of the
1904 Agreement was dismissed as "it would in its crudest
form be an injunction to Officers of the Government to
prevent them carrying out an act of State."' 04 The action in
contract to enforce the 1904 Agreement against a move
from the Laikipia Reserve 105 and the action in tort seeking
damages resulting from the loss of cattle and failing to
provide a road between the Northern and Southern Maasai
reserves as agreed in the 1904 Agreement, were all held to
100. See id. at 88-94.
101. See id. at 94.
102. Id. at 79.
103. See id.
104. Id. at 80.
105. See id. at 79.
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constitute acts done under a treaty. 106 As such, they were
acts of state against which the court could not entertain
challenges, either surrounding their validity or even "a
want of authority on the part of the [treaty's]
signatories." 107 Not even Lenana, the British- appointed
Chief Laibon of the Maasai, could bring such a suit, the
courts held.108
By going to the courts of the British Empire for redress,
the Maasai were using a mode of resistance and
contestation that had been successful on behalf of the Scots
in the landmark Calvin's Case.'0 9 The Maasai also relied on
case law, particularly from India and New Zealand, all of
which had, in a variety of ways, overcome the jurisdictional
bar of both the act of state doctrine and the claim that
certain British possessions, such as the British East African
Protectorate, were foreign countries over which British
courts had no jurisdiction. 110
From the Indian cases, the Maasai argued that with
respect to territories in which British courts had
jurisdiction, the British government could not make
treaties-only agreements with its subjects."' Therefore,
from the Nireaha case from New Zealand, the Maasai
argued that the 1904 Agreement was an agreement as to
land tenure under which the Maasai obtained legal rights
enforceable in British courts. 112 Further, pursuant to
Calvin's Case, which I will discuss further below, the
Maasai argued that they were not aliens in protectorate
courts and further argued that the question of whether the
Maasai were British subjects was irrelevant to their
entitlement to a remedy in protectorate courts. 13
By clothing resistance in the garb of contestations from
prior encounters with the British Empire, the lawyers
arguing on behalf of the Maasai joined a long tradition of
106. See id. at 78-79.
107. Id. at 79.
108. See id.
109. Calvin v. Smith (Calvin's Case), (1608) 77 Eng. Rep. 377 (K.B.).
110. See 01 le Njogo, 5 E.A.P.L.R. at 81-82.
111. See id. at 81.
112. See id.
113. See id.
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seeking to hold the exercise of British colonial authority
accountable by resorting to judicial review. In bringing the
case, the Maasai advanced the claim that the conduct of the
British government within the protectorate should be
guided and reviewed by the same rules of governance
applicable between it and its citizens within Britain. Most
simply put, the Maasai case was predicated on the view
that British colonial governance ought to be exercisable
only in accordance with the law,114 precisely because
(besides the powers it was granted by the legislature) the
Crown did not have any arbitrary power left; 115 and further,
that if the courts ousted themselves of jurisdiction to
adjudicate the case, that would constitute an arbitrary
act. 116
But in borrowing from precedents seeking to govern its
colonial authority, the Maasai had to overcome more than
the fact that the East African Protectorate was outside the
territory of the British Empire. Within the jurisprudence of
the British empire, the Maasai were aliens in more senses
than the fact that their territory was outside the territorial
possessions of the Crown. This is because, since Calvin's
Case in 1602, the bond between the King or Queen, on the
one hand, and his or her subjects, on the other, was birth
within the territory of the Crown by parents owing
allegiance to the Crown. 117 By being born in the realm, a
subject was liable to burdens on the public imposed by the
Crown and, as such, a subject was entitled to access to the
Crown's courts and to rights to land. 118
Calvin's Case laid down the feudal logic that birthright
was the absolute precondition for enjoying the privilege of
litigation and, with it, a remedy from the Crown's courts.
The Maasai attempted to make this feudal logic fit their
circumstances as much as they sought to align with it.
First, the Maasai challenged this feudal logic by arguing
114. See id. at 80.
115. See id. at 87.
116. See id. at 82.
117. See Calvin's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. at 408.
118. See Hulsebosch, supra note 97, at 456.
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they were members of the realm and not outsiders to it,119
both by birth in the realm and also because of the Crown's
control and jurisdiction over the East African
Protectorate. 120 Second, by denying they were sovereign, the
Maasai sought to perfectly align themselves with the feudal
logic of Calvin's Case, because being within the realm
meant one owed allegiance to the Crown. To demonstrate
that they owed allegiance to the Crown, they argued that
they could be charged for treason under protectorate
laws.121
The fact that the Maasai had what seemed to be
compelling arguments consistent with the feudal logic they
were using to advance their case against the Crown, and
the fact that they nevertheless failed, is significant but
perhaps not surprising. It is significant because the Court
found that the Crown owed no remedy to the Maasai,
notwithstanding the fact that the Crown had complete
jurisdiction and control over the East African Protectorate.
This outcome was therefore consistent with the view that,
although the Crown had such complete jurisdiction over
and within the protectorate, the Crown's courts did not.
This result is perhaps unsurprising because it was not the
first time that the Crown had prevailed in arguing the
jurisdiction of its Courts did not reach outside the Crown's
realm. Significantly, international law was necessary to
buttress the unavailability of judicial review in a
protectorate.
Herein, then, lies the reason why the Maasai lawyers
declined to use prevailing international legal arguments to
overcome the objection of the Crown that protectorates were
119. See 01 le Njogo, 5 E.A.P.L.R. at 81. A. Morrison, representing the
Maasai, argued: "This case should be read in the light of Calvin's case, where
,alien' is defined. A Masai is not an alien in the Courts of the Protectorate .... "
Id. Similarly, the court observed: "At the present time . . . [the Maasai] say the
sovereignty of the Crown in the Protectorate is complete, and just as the Masai
were formerly subjects of their chief (Calvin's case), so they are now necessarily
subjects of the Government of the Protectorate, if not actually British subjects."
Id. at 105.
120. See 01 le Njogo, 5 E.A.P.L.R. at 80, 84. A. Morrison argued for the
Maasai: "The complete exercise of the jurisdiction of the Crown in the
Protectorate in fact places the subjects of the Protectorate on the same footing
as British subjects." Id. at 84.
121. See id.
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outside the realm and, as such, that judicial review as a
shield against imperial colonial governance was
unavailable. In fact, rather curiously, it was the domestic
law-embodied in the private law rules of property,
contract, and tort-that seemed to offer better hope for the
Maasai than international law.122
The fact that international law did not offer much hope
for a remedy in favor of the Maasai is explained by the
Court as follows:
Treaties are the subject of international law which is a body of
rules applied to the intercourse between civilised states . . . [but]
"International law touches [P]rotectorates of this kind
[Protectorates over uncivilised and semi-civilised peoples] . . . by
one side only. The protected states or communities are not subject
to a law of which they never heard, their relations to the
protecting state are not therefore determined by International
Law."
. . . It must, however, I think, be taken to be governed by some
rules analogous to International law and to have similar force and
effect to that held by a treaty, and must be regarded by Municipal
Courts in a similar manner 123
This quote is paradoxical. On the one hand, the Court
found that the Maasai were capable of entering into a
treaty, and on the other hand the Court also found that the
relations between the Maasai and the British government
could not be governed by rules of international law, since
the Maasai had never heard of them. One must necessarily
ask: if Maasai-British relations could not be governed by
international law, how could the Maasai enter into a treaty,
122. In this respect, I argue against the claim made by L. L. Kato that by
giving preference to the domestic law of the United Kingdom, common law
courts downplayed the utility of international law in countering the despotic
application of the domestic law of the realm over colonial peoples. See L. L.
Kato, Act of State in a Protectorate-In Retrospect, 1969 PUB. L. 219, 222-23.
Thus, I agree with U. 0. Umozurike, who argues: "[I]nternational law developed
by Western powers before the 20th century served as a buttress for the
colonisation of African peoples. It connived at the subordination of African
dignity to Western economic interests. It was essentially racialist and therefore
contrary to the basic norms of law applicable to all mankind." U.0. Umozurike,
International Law and Colonialism in Africa: A Critique, 3 E. AFR. L.J. 47, 80-81
(1967).
123. 01 le Njogo, 5 E.A.P.L.R. at 91-92 (quoting W.E. Hall, International
Law 126 (5th ed. 1904)) (modifications in original).
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which, by definition, is a creature of, and is governed by,
rules of international law? How could international law
only be available for the purpose of establishing that the
Maasai could enter into a treaty but not for the purpose of
establishing if the treaty had been observed in accordance
with rules of international law?
According to the East African Court of Appeal, its
finding against the Maasai was not based on the fact that
the Maasai had no rights, but, rather, its decision was the
necessary consequence that anything done by the Crown
pursuant to a treaty was an act of State that was not
reviewable in the Crown's courts. 124 Specifically, the Court
of Appeal noted, in agreeing with the court below, "[a]ll that
was decided was that treaties had been made with the
Masai, and that they could not be enforced by Municipal
Courts, and that acts done by officers of the Government in
carrying out these treaties were acts of State and not
cognizable by the Courts."'125
It seems obvious from the foregoing that the findings of
the British courts were not simply based on the act of state
doctrine, or, for that matter, the fact the protectorates were
outside the dominions of the Crown. Rather, the decision
was also racist insofar as it proceeded from the view that
the Maasai were uncivilized or semi-civilized. Such a view
of the Maasai proceeded both from the Court's view of the
superiority of British civilization and Maasai's
backwardness and inferiority. In addition, the
unavailability of a remedy in the Crown's courts, as a result
of conduct flowing from the Crown and its agents, was not
simply inconsistent with the self-proclaimed commitment to
the rule of law by the Crown, but also an implicit
endorsement of the Crown's otherwise illegal conduct by its
courts. The necessary implication of the decision is that the
Crown could engage in any conduct howsoever inconsistent
with the rule of law in relation to peoples considered
uncivilized or semi-civilized residing in a protectorate, even
if the Crown had complete jurisdiction and control. This
124. See id. at 96. Chief Justice Morris Carter argued: "I do not find that the
Chief Justice of the East Africa Protectorate has found that protected native
subjects have no rights against the Protectorate Government, or that the Masai
and their chiefs are not under the original jurisdiction of the High Court." Id.
125. Id.
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attitude, implicitly embracing colonial misgovernance by
the Crown, is not lost on the Court. However, rather than
acknowledge the decision's endorsement of colonial
malfeasance, the Court apologetically-but quite likely
actually unapologetically-observed:
"The idea that there may be an established system of law to which
a man owes obedience, and that at any moment he may be
deprived of the protection of that law, is an idea not easily
accepted by English lawyers. It is made less difficult if one
remembers that the Protectorate is over a country in which a few
dominant civilised men have to control a great multitude of the
semi-barbarous."
If in the interests of peace and good government it was
considered necessary that the Masai should be moved, it was a
natural and politic course for the Government to come to an
agreement with them with this object in view. 12 6
Clearly from this quote, it did not seem that the court
was making any distinction between English law and
English culture-the English were civilized and the Maasai
were not. As such, the British could really do no wrong, for
civilized people are better placed to make decisions over a
multitude of semi-barbarous people. Importantly, anything
done in the interests of peace and good government, God
forbid, could not be inconsistent with the mandate of the
enlightened over the unenlightened. 127 In fact, the East
African Court of Appeal cited Article 35 of the Berlin Act of
1884 to make the point that a declaration of a protectorate
over an uncivilized region came with an obligation to
establish a system of authority, 128 and such a system of
authority over a barbaric and uncivilized people was
compelled by the needs of peace, order, and good
government as required by Article 12 of the Foreign
126. Id. at 97 (quoting Rex v. Earl of Crewe exparte Sekgome, (1910) 2 Eng.
Rep. 576, 610 (K.B.)).
127. Indeed, as Judge Farlow King noted in justifying the agreements
notwithstanding their effect on the Masai: "a treaty could be entered into with
them as a sovereign power, should such a course be thought desirable.
Circumstances pointed in this direction. It was obvious that the Masai, with
their roving habits and warlike traditions, were not desirable neighbors for
white settlers, and that their presence along the recently constructed railway
was hardly consistent with the public interest." Id. at 110.
128. See id. at 92.
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Jurisdiction Act. 129 Here we see a neat overlap of the
domestic law of the British Empire and international law,
insofar as both were cited for approving the proposition that
the establishment of a system of governance over a people
within a protectorate did not constitute a denial of their
territorial sovereignty. I need not emphasize that it is
precisely the establishment of such authority that
undermines the argument that the Maasai were sovereign,
as the courts in this case found the Maasai to be. The courts
in this case were not unaware of this contradiction: they
had an answer ready-made, and the next part of this Article
addresses how the Court's high legal formalism and strict
positivism filled in such inconvenient inconsistencies.
III. THE COURTS' HIGH LEGAL FORMALISM AND STRICTLY
POSITIVIST INTERNATIONAL LAW
As I noted above, to fully appreciate the legal
construction of British East African Protectorate as laid
down by the courts in the Maasai case, it is useful to
consider how the courts deployed the following distinctions
and disaggregations to resolve the tensions and
contradictions in their arguments: first, by arguing that the
limitation of the Crown's prerogatives was available only
through moral principles or the good will of the Crown, but
not by judicial review; second, by making the distinction
between territorial sovereignty on the one hand and
suspended sovereignty on the other; and third, by making
the distinction between power and jurisdiction on the one
hand and territorial dominion on the other. 130
In my view, each of these distinctions and dis-
aggregations is crucial and, in fact, a persistent feature of
legal governance under colonial and imperial structures,
even in the contemporary period. I will say a little about
how each of them facilitated the outcome in the Maasai case
and point to overlaps with contemporary cases in my
conclusions.
129. See id. at 102-03.
130. See id. at 88. Chief Justice Morris-Carter argued the East African
Protectorate had 'not been annexed so as to become part of Her Majesty's
territorial dominions. . . .in the sense of power and jurisdiction, but it is not
under his dominion in the sense of territorial dominion."' Id. (quoting Rex v.
Earl, 2 Eng. Rep. at 603-04).
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A. The Crown's Prerogatives are Limitable by Moral
Principles or its Good Will, but not by Judicial Review
One of the most familiar ways in which common law
courts arrived at the conclusion that they could not legally
interfere with, or limit the exercise of, the Crown's
prerogatives extraterritorially was by invoking the act of
state doctrine. In so doing, common law courts effectively
made the entire complement of the Crown's prerogatives in
a protectorate or foreign possession not amenable to judicial
review and only limitable at the discretion of the Crown by
moral principles. According to the East African Court of
Appeal, the moral principles limitation on the Crown's
prerogative is based on a number of premises. First, that in
relation to a foreigner, the Crown can do anything and
everything without recourse to judicial review, while by
contrast the Crown is limited in its powers in relation to its
subjects because it has authority over its subjects only as
established by the legislature.1 3'
A second rationale for the view that the prerogatives of
the Crown are morally and not legally limitable is found in
the East African Court of Appeal's argument that it was
"settled law that the King can neither do nor authorise a
wrong. '"132 Indeed, it will be remembered that Sir Edward
Coke had long before reassured the Crown that the common
law courts would not meddle with anything done "'beyond
the seas." ' 133
A third premise of the moral limitations principle is
stated in 01 le Njogo, where the court found that common
law courts have no jurisdiction over acts of state. Finally,
the moral limitation principle of the Crown's powers is
based on the view that since protectorates were foreign
territory, though the Crown had authority over them, the
jurisdiction of the common law courts did not go abroad.
In light of these justifications against availability of
judicial review in favor of the Maasai, the East African
Court of Appeal concluded that the only remedy in cases
131. See id. at 100.
132. Id. at 112.
133. See Hulsebosch, supra note 97, at 478 (quoting 3 PARL. HIST. ENG.
(1628) 487).
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like this would be 'by way of appeal to the justice of the
State which inflicts it."'134 A treaty to which the Crown was
a party, in Judge King Farlow's view, only imposed moral
obligations on both the Crown and the Maasai!13 5 These
moral obligations, he (like his brethren) held, were outside
the jurisdiction of the Crown's courts. According to this
logic, it was not really that the Maasai were without a
remedy, although they did not have one under the law;
rather, their remedy lay "upon the sense of justice of the
Government in dealing with their claims." 136
As will be discussed later in this Article, this argument
has also been used in a rather recent case-i.e., the
Guantanamo Bay Detainee case. 137
B. The Disaggregation of Territorial Sovereignty and
Suspended Sovereignty
I have already shown that the Crown argued the
Maasai were sovereign because this argument was
necessary to establish a basis for declining to provide
judicial relief. To credibly argue that the Maasai were
sovereign, the Crown had to demonstrate that the Maasai
had territorial sovereignty or dominion over their territory.
Only then would it have been possible to find that the
Maasai had entered into a treaty ceding their territory to
the British. The major argument advanced to support this
proposition was that the East African Protectorate was a
foreign country outside the dominions of the crown. In other
words, territorial sovereignty was reduced to a mere
technical sovereignty. It is noteworthy of course that to
fortify this conclusion, the courts invoked other
justifications. For example, that until and unless there was
a formal act of annexation of the East African Protectorate,
notwithstanding the Crown's complete jurisdiction and
control, the protectorate remained outside the Crown's
dominions. 138
134. 01 le Njogo, 5 E.A.P.L.R. at 113 (quoting Baron v. Denman, (1848) 154
Eng. Rep. 450 (Exch. Div.)).
135. See id. at 112.
136. Id. at 113.
137. See infra Part IV.A.
138. See 01 le Njogo, 5 E.A.P.L.R. at 92.
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However, the courts' finding that the Maasai were
sovereign raised the paradox that, in actuality, the Maasai
did not have effective control over their territory as a
sovereign is presumed to have under international law.
Indeed the Maasai had given up their territorial
sovereignty in both the 1904 and 1911 Agreements, in
addition to the fact that settlers had began appropriating
Maasai territory for themselves with the tacit and at times
explicit support of the East African Protectorate
government.
To address this anomaly-i.e., the fact that, on the
ground, the Maasai did not have effective control although
it was asserted that they were sovereign-the court invoked
the idea that Maasai territorial sovereignty was in
suspense during the period of the protectorate until
territorial annexation took place in 1920.139 This argument
that Maasai sovereignty was in suspense is also attributed
to John Westlake, a leading international legal expert of
such colonial cases. 140 The East African Court of Appeal,
presumably to be parsimonious in its finding that the
Maasai were sovereign, further argued that the East
African Protectorate was a foreign country and that the
exercise of a full range of arguably sovereign rights and
powers within the protectorate by the Crown were
.'distinguish[able] from territorial sovereignty by however
thin a line.""141
C. The Distinction between Power and Jurisdiction and
Territorial Sovereignty
Another way of framing the distinction between
territorial dominion and suspended sovereignty was the
East African Court of Appeal's distinction between power
and jurisdiction exercised by the Crown in the protectorate,
on the one hand, from territorial sovereignty, on the other.
As we have noted above, one of the ways that this
distinction was maintained was by the insistence on Maasai
territorial sovereignty, and especially the fact that it was
suspended. Another way in which Maasai territorial
139. See id.
140. See id.
141. Id. at 92 (quoting JOHN WESTLAKE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 184 (1904)).
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sovereignty was insisted on was not so much in its
suspension or thinness during the protectorate period, but
rather, in its existence in the pre-protectorate period. Thus,
the East African Court of Appeal argued:
It is at least arguable that [the recognition of jurisdiction of tribal
Chiefs by Section 46 of the Native Courts Regulation of 1897] is a
recognition of a jurisdiction pre-existent to and apart from
jurisdiction conferred by the Order in Council, and is a remnant of
sovereignty still remaining in the Masai; if this be so a further
reason is furnished for considering that a treaty might be made
with the Masai. 14 2
What is really striking about this argument is the
quality of the obsessiveness in seeking a basis-whatever
basis-for establishing that the Maasai could enter into a
treaty with the Crown. This obsessiveness was driven in
large measure to establish that there could not be judicial
redress for an act of state; for, once the agreements were
designated treaties, they were automatically clothed in the
garb of untouchable acts of state by the Crown's courts. 143
Another aspect of this obsessiveness was the trouble
the Court took to establish that the powers and various
jurisdictional competencies exercised under the authority
and instructions of the Crown through the Secretary of
State for Colonies 144  did not constitute territorial
142. Id. at 93.
143. Such use of high formalism to preclude judicial intervention in the
foreign affairs context is not unfamiliar in other contemporary contexts outside
the Guantanamo Bay Detainee cases. For example, in the U.S. the parens
patriae doctrine (which allows sovereigns to sue on behalf of their citizens in the
courts of another country) has been narrowly re-formulated to apply only to
states within the U.S. federal system, on the basis that such states have
surrendered their separate status and become part of the deferral system and,
as such, could be granted review by the courts. By contrast, foreign states had
no such access, as they were not part of the federal system. See Missouri v.
Illinois, 180 U.S. 208, 231 (1901); Estados Unidos Mexicanos v. Decoster, 229
F.3d 332, 339 (1st Cir. 2000) (a foreign state cannot obtain jurisdiction in a
federal court to assert a quasi-sovereign interest involving civil and labor rights
protections of its citizens by a private employer within the U.S.). But see Alfred
L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico ex rel. Barez, 458 U.S. 592, 609-10 (1981)
(holding that Puerto Rico could assert parens patriae standing and U.S. courts
could assume jurisdiction based on principles of federalism-in this case
because Puerto Rico directly participated in the federal employment scheme).
144. Ole le Njogo, 5 E.A.P.L.R. at 77.
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sovereignty, but rather, vestiges of sovereignty
distinguishable from territorial sovereignty. Again, the
East African Court of Appeal stated:
[Slovereignty can still be retained by a State which cedes by treaty
part of its territory with full jurisdiction in that part, there would
seem to be no difficulty in holding that, where an exercise by a
protecting State of the three elements of sovereignty takes place
by sufferance [for a cause]: (1), that exercise should not be deemed
to carry with it more of the sovereignty than is necessary; (2), it is
competent to the protecting State to permit some vestige of
sovereignty to remain in the native authority; and (3), the
protecting State must be taken to have permitted this, unless and
until it has assumed full sovereignty by annexation. 145
I think that the most important aspect of the obsession
with establishing Maasai sovereignty, notwithstanding the
Crown's massive involvement in almost all the Executive,
Judicial, and Legislative affairs in the East African
Protectorate, is the finding that the Maasai acquiesced in
this involvement, and therefore it could not be understood
to constitute a violation, or even a usurpation, of Maasai
sovereignty. What we see here, especially in the creation of
Maasai leadership through legislative efforts such as the
Native Courts Regulation of 1897, are not simply juristic
tools that contradicted the facts on the ground, but rather,
the initial stages in the construction of a type of authority
based not on kinship and religious belief among the Maasai,
but one based on domination. A bourgeois form of the early
State that was juridically autonomous, but in fact
subservient, to the interests of the empire. It is crucial to
note that though the courts were wary of inquiring into the
treaties since they constituted acts of state, the East
African Court of Appeal went out of its way to observe that
the Village Headmen Ordinance and the Native Courts
Regulation of 1897 established a basis for selection of
persons among the Maasai by the Crown to make treaties
with it for the removal of the Maasai people from their
land. 146 Thus the act of state doctrine was a crucial device
for the court to preclude it from inquiring into whether
those appointed by the crown from among the Maasai to
145. Id. at 92.
146. See id. at 94.
1048 [Vol. 54
IMPERIALISM
enter into a treaty with it could do so on behalf of the
Maasai. By declining to enter into such an inquiry with
regard to the Village Headmen Ordinance and the Native
Courts Regulation, the courts in effect legitimated the
establishment of authority based on domination, for how
they were selected or if they in fact represented the Maasai
people was irrelevant. 147 It was therefore not simply the
formalism of appointment to office of chief that was crucial,
but rather the effect the appointment had in legitimating
colonial authority by establishing status differentiation
between the Maasai chiefs as political leaders and the
Maasai people as followers, even though there was no
consultation with the Maasai people. It is remarkable how
status differentiation between leaders and followers by
virtue of the superior rank of leaders gives the leader
authority to speak on behalf of the people and to make
commitments on their behalf without consulting them. By
acquiescing to the authority of these chiefs, the court in the
Maasai case was legitimating the authority of these chiefs
to move the Maasai people from their land once, and then
again, in contravention of earlier contractual commitments
not to do so. The court was also sanctifying as
unimpeachable the authority conferred on these chiefs once
dressed up in the bourgeois form.
My argument here is, therefore, that the juristic
techniques of the bourgeois form employed by the courts are
not at all bothered by forms of authority that have been
established in accordance with bourgeois logic; it is totally
irrelevant if such authority had the democratic legitimacy
with the Maasai people. The court was simply satisfied by
the fact that the chiefs had been selected under the
legislative authority of the East African Protectorate, even
if their selection and appointment was inconsistent with the
customs of the Maasai people. 148
As noted earlier in this Article, the designation of these
chiefs by the British in turn established an institutionalized
147. According to Justice King Farlow, "[i]t is also clear that the Crown in
making a treaty can select or recognize such persons as it may think fit as
representatives to bind the other high contracting party. I see nothing in the
Village Headmen Ordinance . . . to prevent the Government from selecting
chiefs or other persons from among the Masai to represent the Masai people."
Id. at 110.
148. See id.
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claim on the social surplus based on their political
domination of the Maasai. In short, these juristic forms of
the chieftaincy, among others, were crucial to the
establishment of market relations that favored British
settler interests and those Maasai closest to the British at
the expense the rest of the Maasai.
I want to re-emphasize as I have argued from the
outset, that, at best, the outcome of the encounter between
the Maasai and the British settler class was the beginning
of a dialectical struggle between two irreconcilable visions:
one Maasai and based largely on kinship, the other British
as exported to the East African Protectorate by British
settlers, and largely, I would argue, bourgeois and class-
based. This dialectical struggle was complicated by the fact
that among the Maasai there emerged a class of British
designated leaders whose legitimacy was established by
bourgeois forms of law and state accompanied by state
violence. However, this does not in any sense imply that the
Maasai automatically fell in lock step with their appointed
leadership-they were not and are not a homogenous
communal or peasant group.
Thus, the declaration of the East African Protectorate
in 1895 was only the first stage in the transformation of a
pre-colonial, largely communal community and its
incorporation into a global economy fast on the road
towards what we know now as Kenya today-a State based
not on kinship authority, but on the domination of non-
producing class, the capitalists, over the producers, the
wage-laborers. In a sense, contemporary Kenya, where the
domination of the capitalists is necessary to safeguard the
appropriation of surplus value not so much through force,
but through "rights of property in the means of production
and in the product and by the impersonal operation of the
market," 149 is the State that was established following the
annexation of the East African Protectorate in 1895.150
Within this new bourgeois form, the consent of the
Maasai became the quintessential hallmark to mediate and
respond to the anti-formalist and anti-positivist claim
brought by the Maasai that the power and jurisdiction
exercised by the Crown in the protectorate undermined
149. Chatterjee, supra note 27, at 359.
150. See supra note 28.
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their so-called sovereignty the Crown argued it had. After
all, a declaration of a protectorate under prevailing
jurisprudence did not extinguish but rather presupposed
the continuation of "some elements of sovereignty"151 on the
Maasai, and it was for this reason the Maasai were
competent to enter into a treaty with the British. Further,
according to the courts, the Maasai were "the subjects of
their chiefs or their local government, whatever form that
government may in fact take."'152
In addition, the Court fortified its decision by observing
that the Crown had not made a grant of a Constitution to
the Maasai, and, as such, this was evidence that the East
African Protectorate had not become part of the dominions
of the Crown since there had been no establishment of full
British constitutional rule. 15 3 Indeed, while the Maasai
harped at their lack of power and jurisdiction, which was
being exercised by the Crown in the protectorate, the Court
insisted that territorial sovereignty, rather than those
powers and jurisdictional mandates of the Crown, was the
decisive test of who was sovereign. To further establish the
case against the Maasai, the Court emphasized that no
formal act of annexation by the Crown had taken place to
make the East African Protectorate a part of the British
Empire. 154
Similar arguments about the distinction between
territorial sovereignty and jurisdiction arose in habeas
cases arising from protectorates. Although the Habeas
Corpus Act of 1862 did not prohibit habeas petitions from
protectorates, this distinction was invoked to prevent
issuances of the writs. Rex v. Earl of Crewe 155 serves as an
example. In that case, an African chief, Sekgome, was
arrested, detained, and deported under the authority of the
British High Commissioner in the Bechuanaland
Protectorate. 5 6 In a proclamation, the High Commissioner
151. Ole le Njogo, 5 E.A.P.L.R. at 91.
152. Id. at 90.
153. See id. at 87, 89.
154. See id. at 88, 92.
155. (1910) 2 Eng. Rep. 576 (K.B.). See also Reviews of Books, 36 BRIT. Y.B.
INT'L L. 493, 495 (1963).
156. See id.
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indemnified the subordinate officer for the detention, and
further prohibited any process questioning the legality of
the arrest, or detention, or any matter so connected with, to
have any effect within the protectorate. 157 Sekgome first
attempted to challenge his detention in the High Court of
Griqualand (northern Cape) but failed. 158 Sekgome made an
offer to the Commissioner in 1907 to renounce his claim to
the chieftainship if he was freed and allowed to emigrate to
a part of Barotseland (now part of Zambia). 159 His offer was
rejected and so was his petition for release in May 1908.160
In early 1909, Sekgome was offered release from detention
on the condition that he agreed to take up residence in the
eastern part of the Transvaal; Sekgome, however, decided
not to accept the offer. Instead, Sekgome challenged his
three-year detention in the King's Bench in England, where
he applied for a writ of habeas corpus directed to the
Secretary of State for the Colonies, the Earl of Crewe. 161
Sekgome's application centered on the validity of the
instrument that kept him in detention-namely, the
proclamation by the High Commissioner. The Divisional
Court heard the case initially and dismissed his application
on two grounds: first, that the protectorate was a foreign
dominion of the Crown within Section 1 of the Habeas
Corpus Act of 1862 (although the legislation did not
expressly preclude habeas for protectorates as opposed to
colonies and dominions); and, second, the Divisional Court
denied relief on the ground that the Earl of Crewe was not
the custodian of the body of Sekgome, and, therefore, the
writ was improperly addressed to him. 162
An appeal ensued. A divided court dismissed the
appeal, relying upon the ground that the proclamation by
the High Commissioner was a valid enactment, which could
157. Id.
158. See Sekgome Letsolathebe v. Panzera, 1906 (10) S.C. 90 (HCG) (S.
Mr.), cited in A.J.G.M. Sanders, Sekgoma Letsholathebe's Detention and the
Betrayal of a Protectorate, 23 COMP. & INT'L L.J. S. AFR. 348, 353-54 (1990).
159. Id. at 354.
160. Id.
161. Rex v. Earl of Crewe, (1910) 2 Eng. Rep. 576 (K.B.).
162. Id. at 579.
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not be questioned by a court of law. 163 In brief, the court
found that there was
no court of law in the protectorate which could have issued a writ
of habeas corpus, and in addition decided that the Habeas Corpus
Act of 1862 applied to His Majesty's "territorial dominions" only,
and therefore not to the protectorate. By taking this stance, the
court put itself in a position to dispose of Sekgome's complaint
finally and authoritatively. 164
The case was representative of an ambiguous and
complicated status associated with a protectorate, which
was "both a political and legal antinomy, bristling with
juridical contradictions as well as with international
difficulties," and was depicted as "'a territory earmarked for
the future enjoyment of the protecting State.""1 65 Despite
the fact that a British Protectorate was not deemed part of
the dominions of the Crown, it was legally subject to the
jurisdiction of the British Crown, which had its power over
natives as well as British subjects. 166 Pursuant to an Order
in Council made under the Foreign Jurisdiction Act 1890,
the High Commissioner had the authority to "exercise in
the Bechuanaland Protectorate the powers of Her Majesty,"
and to issue proclamations in the administration of justice
and good governance of all persons within the Protectorate,
provided any such acts were not in violation of the Act of
Parliament. 167
The appellate court upheld the proclamation
authorizing Sekgome's detention as a valid exercise of
executive power. In particular, Lord Justice Farwell did not
hesitate to reach the conclusion that the Act of 1890
allowed the Crown to establish a despotism by virtue of
which the High Commissioner exercised judicially un-
reviewable authority. 168 The other justices also "deplored
the possibility by which a man might at any time be
163. Id.
164. Sanders, supra note 158, at 356.
165. Norman Bentwich, Habeas Corpus in the Empire, 27 LAW Q. REV. 454,
458 (1911).
166. See id.
167. See id.
168. See id. at 460.
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deprived of the protection of the law."' 69 It is indeed "a
harsh result that the natives in a protected territory lose,
together with the control of their country, the protection of
their own customs without obtaining that of the legal
system of the protecting country."'170
However, Lord Justice Vaughan Williams held that the
arrest and detention of Sekgome were acts of state and
were therefore not judicially reviewable. 17' According to
him,
an act which would otherwise be an actionable wrong may be so
authorized or adopted by a Government as to make it an act of
State for which no individual is liable, has been limited to actions
done by an English officer in a foreign country to a foreigner in
discharge of orders received from the Crown. 172
Thus, since the protectorate was considered a foreign
country, it afforded immunity to acts of the King's
officers. 173 As in 01 le Njogo, the Sekgome court held that, in
a protectorate, courts do not have the power to review the
conduct of the Crown even though in both cases the Crown
had complete control and jurisdiction of the protectorates.
However, because of the fact that, in a protectorate, the
Crown was held not to have territorial dominion, the courts
could not issue orders against it.
IV. THE CONTEMPORARY RELEVANCE OF THE MAASAI CASE
We have seen that the East African Court of Appeal, in
its decision in the Maasai case, invoked technical arguments
by making distinctions between territorial sovereignty or
dominion, on the one hand, and power, jurisdiction, or
control, on the other; or by arguing the prerogatives of
powerful governments, while not limitable by judicial review,
are limitable by moral principles or political or diplomatic
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 460-61 (citing Baron v. Denman, (1848) 154 Eng. Rep. 450 (Exch.
Div.)).
173. Id. at 461.
1054 [Vol. 54
IMPERIALISM
intervention, 174 to justify its decision. These arguments are
not restricted to the Maasai case but are in fact ubiquitous
amongst analogous common law cases, including those of the
U.S. federal judiciary. Ultimately, these arguments, which
are predicated on such technical distinctions around
questions of jurisdiction and remedy, are about power-
particularly with regard to questions of the breadth and
scope in the relations between the metropole and the
periphery, rule and the ruled, the protectors and the
protected, the U.S. government and its control and
jurisdiction over distant lands, the federal government and
the Indian nations, 175 the several States and the Indian
nations, 176 and the federal government and its many
territories, and so on.
A. The Moral Principles Limitation in Analogous U.S.
Cases
The argument that the Crown's authority is only
limitable by moral rather than judicial review is not new in
federal litigation analogous to the Maasai case. Indeed, this
argument can be traced as far back as Justice Marshall's
decision in Strother v. Lucas, 77 which held that "[t]he
officers to whom jurisdiction for the sale of lands shall be
sub-delegated, shall proceed with mildness, gentleness, and
174. See, e.g., 01 le Njogo, 5 E.A.P.L.R. at 112-13. Lord Justice King Farlow,
in denying an appeal from an indigenous community alleging breach of a
contract on the part of the British government, argued that the community's
only remedy was 'by way of appeal to the justice of the State which inflicts it,"'
since the community's remedy lay "upon the sense of justice of the Government
in dealing with their claims." Id. at 113.
175. See, e.g., Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515, 543 (1832) ("But power,
war, conquest, give rights, which, after possession, are conceded by the world;
and which can never be controverted by those on whom they descend.").
176. See, e.g., Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1 (1831).
177. Strother v. Lucas, 37 U.S. 410 (1838).
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moderation, with verbal, and not judicial proceeding .... ,178
Another classic along this line of reasoning is Justice
Sutherland's famous dictum in the U.S. Supreme Court
case, Curtiss-Wright.179 In that case, Justice Sutherland
held that the President's foreign affairs power, unlike his
domestic power, is not limited by constraints such as the
Bill of Rights'SO-a view that the Supreme Court has
recently reiterated. 8 1
I will begin the discussion by first drawing out
parallelisms between the Maasai case and the Guantanamo
Bay Detainee cases with regard to the four premises
underlying the moral principles limitation that were
outlined earlier. 8 2 Take, for example, the first premise
that, in relation to a foreigner, the Crown can do anything
and everything without recourse to judicial review, while,
by contrast, the Crown is limited in its powers in relation to
its subjects because it has authority over its subjects only
as established by the legislature 8 3 This seems similar to
178. Id. at 440. See also Johnson v. McIntosh 21 U.S. 543, 590 (1823) ("But
the tribes of Indians inhabiting this country were fierce savages, whose
occupation was war, and whose subsistence was drawn chiefly from the forest.
To leave them in possession of their country, was to leave the country a
wilderness . . . ."). In Strother, by contrast, with regard to the White settlers, the
Court found, after examining their customs, usages, and local laws: "Such are
the laws, usages, and customs of Spain, by which to ascertain what was
property in the ceded territory, when it came into the hands of the United
States, charged with titles originating thereby; creating rights of property of all
grades and description." 37 U.S. at 446.
179. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
180. Id. at 320.
181. In United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259 (1990), the
Supreme Court held that evidence obtained pursuant to a warrantless search
carried out under the supervision of U.S. officials in a Mexican residence or
against a Mexican citizen was admissible since the Constitution does not
protect noncitizens with respect to the extraterritorial conduct of the U.S.
government, even though the evidence would not have been admissible in a U.S.
criminal proceeding if the search had occurred in the United States. In a similar
context, in United States v. Duarte-Acero, 296 F.3d 1277, 1283 (11th Cir. 2002),
cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1038 (2002), the court of appeals affirmed a district court
ruling that U.S. Drug Administration Enforcement Agents do not have a duty to
comply with the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights when they
act outside the United States and within the boundaries of another country.
182. See supra Part III.A.
183. See 01 le Njogo v. Att'y Gen., (1913) 5 E.A.P.L.R. 70, 100 (Kenya).
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the argument that the Bush administration is making in
the Guantanamo Bay Detainee cases.
The second rationale mentioned above for the view that
the prerogatives of the Crown are morally, and not legally,
limitable is the "settled law that the King can neither do
nor authorise a wrong."18 4 A telling, modern example of this
rationale is evident in the reason given by Paul Clement on
behalf of the Bush administration in the Padilla case in
April 2004 before the Supreme Court.18 5 He argued that
there should be no judicial review of holding of enemy
combatants or habeas, and, when pressed what would
ensure there was no torture, Clement argued that the
United States does not torture, and that the good will of the
United States was the best check against torture.18 6
Another parallelism is exemplified by the third premise
of the moral limitations principle-i.e., as is stated in the
Maasai case, common law courts have no jurisdiction over
acts of state. Again, this argument is very similar to the one
made in defense of holding the detainees at Guantanamo
Bay, as I will show below. While common law courts use the
act of state doctrine, U.S. federal courts invoke the
separation of powers constraint to preclude judicial
interference with Executive extraterritorial (or foreign
affairs) conduct, particularly during wartime.
In addition, the fourth moral limitation principle of the
Crown's powers is based on the view that, since
protectorates were foreign territory, and though the Crown
had authority over them, the jurisdiction of the common law
courts did not go abroad. This argument by now has been
used extensively to defend the holding of detainees in
Guantanamo Bay, a foreign country like the East African
Protectorate in 01 le Njogo, although the United States has
complete jurisdiction and control over the island very much
the same way the British had over the East African
Protectorate. In other words, just as the Crown argued that
protectorates were foreign territory outside the jurisdiction
of the Crown's court, the Executive branch has argued that
habeas does not extend to foreign citizens abroad even
184. See id. at 112.
185. Transcript of Oral Argument, Padilla v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 426 (2004)
(No. 03-1027), 2004 WL 1066129.
186. Id.
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where the detainees are held under the complete
jurisdiction and control of the United States.
Furthermore, as mentioned above with regard to the
Maasai case, the East African Court of Appeal concluded
that the only remedy in a case such as that would be "by
way of appeal to the justice of the State which inflicts it."'1 7
Likewise, the Bush administration has argued that since
the foreign detainees cannot invoke the jurisdiction of U.S.
federal courts, it does not mean that they are without
remedies.18 8 Rather, they are entitled to diplomatic and
political review and scrutiny and, as such, are not without a
remedy. In Rasul v. Bush, the Bush administration argued
that:
"[The] responsibility for observance and enforcement of these
rights [stated in the Geneva Convention] is upon political and
military authorities." . . . [These] "rights of alien enemies are
vindicated... only through protests and intervention of protecting
powers as the rights of our citizens against foreign governments
are vindicated only by Presidential intervention." 189
I raise the Bush administration's argument in the
Guantanamo Bay Detainee cases to illustrate one of the
overriding objectives in this project-i.e., to show the
continuity, power and resilience of a common doctrinal
framework in imperial and colonial projections of empire.
Of course this is not to suggest that the Solicitor General's
Office in the Bush administration has been foraging the
archives for cases like 01 le Njogo to come up with this
argument. That would be giving them too much credit.
Indeed, the point here is that these structures are so
embedded in the jurisdictional power map of expanding and
187. Id. at 113; 01 le Njogo, 5 E.A.P.L.R. at 113 (quoting the "words of Parke
B.").
188. See also Cherokee v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1, 20 (1831) ("If it be true that
the Cherokee nation have rights, this is not the tribunal in which in those
rights are to be asserted. If it be true that wrongs have been inflicted, and that
still greater are to be apprehended, this is not the tribunal which can redress
the past or prevent the future.").
189. Brief for the Respondents at 47, Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004)
(Nos. 03-334 and 03-343) (quoting Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 789
n. 14. (1950)). In several other contexts, U.S. courts have held that judicial relief
would create undesirable conflicts with remedies that Congress and the
Executive branch had in the foreign affairs domain.
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conquering empires of the common law variety that one
does not even have to have heard of the Maasai case to
come up with a detailed jurisdictional structure or the type
of high formalism and positivism like the one that the
Maasai courts developed.
The premises underlying the moral limitations
principle are especially evident when foreign injury claims
against the U.S. government relate to national security or
essential interests, particularly in the war context. One
such example is El-Shifa Pharmaceutical Industries Co. v.
United States.190  In 1998, the U.S. bombed a
pharmaceutical factory in the Sudan for involvement in the
production of materials for chemical weapons and its
association with Osama bin Laden. After the bombing, the
U.S. government confirmed that the bombing was mistaken
since there was no proof that there was any production of
chemical weapons at the factory or link to Osama bin
Laden. The owners of the pharmaceutical factory, Sudanese
citizens, sued the U.S. government in the Court of Federal
Claims to recover compensation for the destruction of their
factory.191 The court dismissed the suit on the premise that
when the President exercises his Commander-in-Chief
powers, courts are hamstrung to give relief to injured
foreign citizens, even if the President acted mistakenly.
Thus, while in El-Shifa Pharmaceutical Industries, the
court argued that deference to the Commander-in-Chiefs
war-making powers precluded the Court from giving relief,
in the common law cases glossed over in Rasul,192 courts
similarly abstained from deciding cases involving injury to
non-citizens or non-citizen property within the empire's
colonial possessions. Rather than applying the act of state
doctrine though, the Executive branch often argues that the
separation of powers doctrine constrains courts from
interfering the Executive's constitutional authority to be
the sole organ in the realm of foreign affairs, particularly
during wartime. 193
Similar arguments deploying extraterritoriality to
preclude outcomes that would hold powerful governments
190. El-Shifa Pharm. Indus. Co. v. United States, 55 Fed. C1. 751 (2003).
191. Id.
192. See generally Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004).
193. El-Shifa Pharm. Indus. Co., 55 Fed. C1. 751 (2003).
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to account have also been deployed as recently as 2001 in
the context of European Court of Human Rights. In its
December 2001 decision in Bankovic v. Belgium, 94 the
European Court of Human Rights declined to issue orders
sought by six Yugoslavian nationals against the seventeen
NATO member states concerning the bombing of the
Serbian Radio and Television Headquarters in Belgrade in
the course of the NATO air campaign during the Kosovo
conflict. 195 The applicants alleged that their rights to life
and to freedom of expression, as well as their right to an
effective remedy, guaranteed under the European
Convention on Human Rights, were infringed. 196
The European Court of Human Rights dismissed the
application, holding that it lacked jurisdiction because the
European Convention was territorial in scope, and does not
apply to the territory of non-contracting states-such as
Yugoslavia-unless it can be established that the affected
individuals or territory were within the "effective control" of
contracting states. 197 This rationale is analogous to the
holding by the District Court for the District of Columbia
that the United States does not have de facto sovereignty
over Guantanamo Bay.198 In Bankovic, the European Court
of Human Rights held it had no jurisdiction to determine
the liability of the allied NATO powers for alleged damage
to the radio and television stations in Yugoslavia. Similarly,
the District Court in Rasul had found, on analogous
grounds based on extraterritoriality, that it could not
entertain a suit to determine the responsibility of the
United States for holding foreign nationals at Guantanamo
Bay indefinitely. Ultimately, Rasul notwithstanding,
194. Bankovic v. Belgium, 2001-XII Eur. Ct. H.R. 333, reprinted in 123 INT'L
L. REP. 94 (2001).
195. See 123 INT'L L. REP. at 98-99. See also Michael Mandel, Politics and
Human Rights in International Criminal Law: Our Case Against NATO and the
Lessons to Be Learned From It, 25 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 95 (2001) (discussing the
failed attempt to commence an investigation of illegal aerial bombardments by
U.S.-led NATO allies in the Kosovo intervention).
196. See 123 INT'L L. REP. at 102.
197. Id. at 110.
198. See Rasul v. Bush, 215 F. Supp. 2d 55, 71-73 (D.D.C. 2002)
(characterizing the United States' position with respect to Guantanamo Bay as
merely that of a lessee of property, and the detainees status as merely that of
migrants).
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common law courts and metropolitan authorities often
deploy arguments about extraterritoriality to immunize the
conduct of Western powers and the United States outside
their geographic limits.199
B. The Distinction Between Power and Jurisdiction and
Territorial Sovereignty
The distinction between power and jurisdiction, on the
one hand, and territorial sovereignty, on the other, in the
Maasai case is an important forerunner of the notion of
failed states-for how else does it differ from the juridical
statehood of so many juridical states that have no effective
control over their territory2 00 or barely have the ability to
control their economic and political destiny?201
The Bush administration's 2002 National Security
Strategy mobilizes this distinction by arguing that states
that cannot stand by themselves have conditional
sovereignty.20 2 Some scholars have even argued that re-
colonization may be necessary to address the crisis of failed
states.203
Makau wa Mutua has argued forcefully that failed sub-
Saharan African states blindingly adopted the
Westaphalian model of statehood, and he traces the
illegitimacy of the contemporary African state to the alien
199. In a similar context, the court in United States v. Duarte-Acero
affirmed a district court ruling that U.S. Drug Administration Enforcement
Agents do not have a duty to comply with the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights when they act outside the United States and within the
boundaries of another country. 296 F.3d 1277, 1283 (11th Cir. 2002), cert.
denied, 537 U.S. 1038 (2002).
200. See generally John H. Jackson, The Varied Politics of International
Juridical Bodies-Reflections on Theory and Practice, 25 MICH. J. INT'L L. 869
(2004).
201. See Ruth Gordon, Saving Failed States: Sometimes a Neocolonialist
Notion, 12 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 903 (1997).
202. National Security Strategy of the United States, Sept. 2002, available
at http://www.whitehouse.gov/ncs/nss.html.
203. See, e.g., Inis L. Claude, Jr., The United Nations of the Cold War:
Contributions to the Post-Cold War Situation, 18 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 789, 790
(1995).
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character of the Westaphalian model.204 Obiora Okafor has
shown how the uncritical reception of international legal
doctrines resulted in reproducing "the colonial era's violent
and brutal state-building" into post-colonial Africa. 20 5
Ikechi Mgbeoji has also persuasively shown how, by
upholding the fictional nature of the Liberian state, the
United States and European countries legitimized and
encouraged a civil war.20 6
C. Imperialism in Contemporary Time
As noted at the outset, one of the fundamental aspects
of imperialism is the notion of expansion of economic and
investment interests. This understanding of imperialism
would lead to the hypothesis that a nation engaged in
imperialism would naturally seek to protect its interests
abroad by invoking extraterritorial jurisdiction. On the
surface, it would seem that the ease with which U.S. federal
courts invoke extraterritorial jurisdiction over commercial
conduct is inconsistent with their reluctance to examine the
legality of extraterritorial detentions of enemy aliens.
However, as I have argued elsewhere:
[I]t is precisely because of this apparent incongruity that
jurisdiction over extraterritorial commercial conduct must be
examined. The motivations for barring extraterritorial jurisdiction
to enemy aliens and finding jurisdiction over extraterritorial
commercial conduct reflect perfect symmetry, because both
advance the interests of the United States--one its global
commercial interests, the other its domestic and global security
interests. 20 7
204. See Dr. Makau wa Mutua, Why Redraw the Map of Africa: A Moral and
Legal Inquiry, 16 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1113 (1995).
205. Obiora Chinedu Okafor, After Matyrdom: International Law, Sub-State
Groups, and Construction of Legitimate Statehood in Africa, 41 HARV. INT'L L.J.
503, 511 (2000).
206. See IKECHI MGBEOJI, COLLECTIVE INSECURITY: THE LIBERIAN CRISIS,
UNILATERALISM, AND GLOBAL ORDER (2003).
207. James Thuo Gathii, Torture, Extraterritoriality, Terrorism, and
International Law, 67 ALB. L. REV. 335, 364 (2003).
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United States v. Aluminum Company of America208 is
one of the leading statements of the extraterritorial
application of U.S. commercial laws. The court in that case
applied U.S. antitrust laws to extraterritorial commercial
events, despite a lack of any express Congressional intent to
make the statute applicable extraterritorially. 209 The
Supreme Court endorsed this rule, known as the effects
doctrine, in its decision in Hartford Fire Insurance
Company v. California.210 Although the discussion up to
this point seems to indicate that federal courts will invoke
extraterritorial jurisdiction over any commercial conduct
abroad, there have been incidents of judicial abstention,
particularly in cases addressing issues raised by legislation
on environmental issues 211  and civil rights.212  These
instances of judicial abstention from commercial activities
reflects the fundamental proposition of promoting U.S.
commercial interests abroad, unfettered by public policy
considerations. Therefore, just as courts invoke notions of
extraterritoriality to immunize the conduct of the United
States outside their geographic limits-as in the denial of
jurisdiction over habeas corpus petitions by foreign
detainees, thereby promoting U.S. governmental interests
abroad-courts invoke similar arguments in order to
promote U.S. commercial interests abroad.
208. 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
209. Id. at 443 (holding that "it is settled law .. that any state may impose
liabilities, even upon persons not within its allegiance, for conduct outside its
borders that has consequences within its borders which the state reprehends..
. ."). The case, therefore, stands for the proposition that the Sherman Act
subjects extraterritorial commercial conduct that has substantial, direct, and
foreseeable effects on U.S. domestic or foreign commerce to liability in federal
courts. This doctrine is also referred to as the effects doctrine.
210. 509 U.S. 764, 796-99 (1993). The Court asserted that the United States
antitrust laws will apply "even where the foreign state has a strong policy to
permit or encourage such conduct." Id at 799.
211. See, e.g., Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Nuclear Regulatory
Comm'n, 647 F.2d 1345, 1352 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (holding that the court lacked
jurisdiction to review the consequences of maintaining a nuclear reactor
overseas on both foreign citizens and citizens of the United States who are
residing in that foreign country).
212. See, e.g., EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil. Co., 499 U.S. 244, 258 (1991)
(holding that Title VII of the Civil Rights Act did not extend to an American
citizen employed by an American Corporation abroad). Congress subsequently
reversed this holding. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f) (1991).
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CONCLUSION
This Article sought to explore the relationship between
imperialism and colonialism in nineteenth-century
international law. As we have seen, international legal
doctrines surrounding British protectorates of the
nineteenth century did not distinguish between imperialism
as represented by the introduction of rules and practices of
English private and business law into the colonies, on the
one hand, and colonialism, particularly as exemplified by
rules of acquisition of title to territory, on the other. My
examination of the relationship between imperialism and
colonialism demonstrates that the international legal rules
of British protectorates were internally inconsistent with
their claims of liberty and their repressive consequences for
colonial peoples. This resulting inconsistency created an
opportunity for resistance and reconstitution of colonial
territorial acquisition by colonized peoples, as evidenced in
the Maasai cases. Thus, while the formal understanding of
protectorates was that they were foreign countries, the
Maasai unsuccessfully argued that their sovereignty was
illusory because the British administration had complete
control and jurisdiction over the British East African
Protectorate administration. Clearly, both the oppressive
and contradictory nature of imperial expansion, in turn,
informed resistance and reconstitution, and even though
the Maasai failed in their efforts to use the right of
litigation in common law courts to resist the British
Empire. However, even though the Maasai were precluded
from exercising the right to sue the Crown, the march of the
common law in the establishment of regimes of private law
of property, contract, tort, and maritime law, to support the
expanding capitalist economy in the East African
Protectorate proceeded without restriction. Finally, we have
seen how the same detailed jurisdictional structure or type
of high formalism and positivism, like the one which the
Maasai courts developed, is engrained in the jurisdictional
power map of expanding and conquering empires-
especially as the same arguments put forth by the Maasai
courts in reaching its conclusion in barring jurisdiction are
parallel to those proffered in the contemporary U.S. cases
dealing with habeas petitions from foreign detainees at
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Guantanamo Bay.213 Ultimately, it seems, whether a court
will invoke jurisdiction over extraterritorial conduct, either
governmental or commercial, turns on whether the
extraterritorial conduct serves its nation's interests. 214
In conclusion, I am compelled to quote at length the
words of Ewart S. Grogan, one of the most well-known and
richest settlers in Kenya at the time of the taking of Maasai
land. This quote, in my view, captures both the formal
empire of land acquisition for settler purposes, as well as its
connection to the establishment of regimes of private law to
superintend over the surplus of the colonial economy to the
non-laboring classes:
I will ignore Biblical platitudes as to the equality of men ... and
take as a hypothesis what is patent to all who have observed the
African native, that he is fundamentally inferior in mental
development and ethical possibilities (call it soul if you will) to the
white man.
... We have undertaken his education and advancement, as we
have carefully explained by the mawkish euphemisms in which we
wrap our [European] land-grabbing schemes....
A good sound system of compulsory labour would do more to
raise the nigger in five years than all the millions that have been
sunk in missionary efforts for the last fifty .... Then let the native
be compelled to work so many months in the year at a fixed and
reasonable rate, and call it compulsory education. 2
15
213. See generally Lauren Benton, Constitutions and Empires, 31 LAw &
SOC. INQUIRY 177 (2006), and James Thuo Gathii, The American Origins of
Liberal and Illiberal Regimes of International Governance in the Marshall
Court, 54 BUFF. L. REV. 765 (2006) (exploring the links between imperialism
today and in the past). In a related development, in 2004 the Maasai brought
suit against the British government in British courts for the British removal of
the Maasai from their land in contravention of the 1904 Agreement. See Paul
Redfern, Colonialism: Britain Faces Lawsuit from EA, E. AFR., Jan. 26, 2004,
available at www.nationaudio.com/News/EastAfrican/26012004/Regional]
Regional2601200425.html.
214. Here there is no better work than that of Antony Anghie's in showing
the persistence of imperialism in international law from its roots in naturalism
into positivism and into its contemporary self-determination phase of
institution building and sovereign equality. See ANGHIE, supra note 27.
215. EWART S. GROGAN & ARTHUR H. SHARP, FROM THE CAPE TO CAIRO 351-60
(1902), quoted in Wa-Githumo, supra note 19, at 224.
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Clearly, the colonial mission of taking territorial control
was not conceptually separable from the establishment of
regimes of labor and tax law that forced Africans to work on
commercial plantations. In addition, the emerging regime of
property law reflected in individual ownership in land not
only privatized land ownership but also disinherited the
Maasai of their collective ownership of land. Ultimately,
both the project of territorial conquest and that of the
expanding capitalist economy built on the extraction of
surplus capital went hand in hand. International law was
deeply implicated in this conflation of formal and informal
empire and in the creation of the modern African state.
